Small Cameras Can Create a Big Problem

American motorists are being swept up in a reckless nationwide mass surveillance scheme

Last week I traveled to Atlanta, and while riding around the ATL, it immediately struck me just how surveilled this region is. In a single day, I passed roughly 50 ALPR cameras installed along major arteries, outside residential neighborhoods, schools, shopping centers, and other heavily trafficked areas. The level of surveillance could have rivaled Shanghai. The City in a Forest is a micro police state.

The Atlanta metropolitan region boasts a sizable–and still growing–population of more than 6 million people. Atlanta is also home to Flock–the largest manufacturer of automatic license plate readers (ALPRs)–and has earned a reputation as one of the most-surveilled cities in the world. Most drivers probably don’t even realize that their communities have become targets of a seemingly harmless mass surveillance system.

But if only it were harmless. The network of ALPRs that is expanding across the country is rife with abuse and raises serious concerns about grand promises of greater security at the expense of serious encroachments on Americans’ civil liberties. The explosion of ALPRs along American roadways has given law enforcement considerable access to data on American motorists and their behavior. That these tools are marketed to agencies in heavily populated areas and constructed along our busiest roads is no coincidence.

ALPRs have been utilized by law enforcement agencies for decades. These cameras have been used to compare license plates with databases and generate records on vehicle information. Advances in technology such as artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and computer vision have dramatically improved the effectiveness of ALPRs. Now ALPRs are able to create a detailed portrait of an individual’s life; they target millions of motorists as they go about their daily lives, commuting to places to conduct legally permissible and constitutionally protected activities such as health clinics, gun shops, places of worship, union halls, and protests.

Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and this extends to their activities on American roads to and from places they frequent. The act of driving is not itself indicative of one’s intent to commit a crime. Not every person behind the wheel of a car is a criminal. Innocent Americans who have not committed a crime are subjected to this mass surveillance, and the data collected from ALPRs is not discarded. Supporters argue that Americans who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear, but Americans who have nothing to hide have no reason to be spied upon.

Across the top 50 most populated cities in the United States, there are nearly 537,000 cameras that monitor a population of about 49 million people. This is an average ratio of 11 cameras per 1,000 people. Atlanta, the most surveilled city in America, has 124.14 cameras per 1,000 people. New York City has the most cameras in total: 70,882. These cameras are installed under the guise of crime prevention, but there has yet to be any strong indication that a higher volume of cameras is correlated to a reduction in crime.

These cameras might increase the perception of safety, but the most surveilled cities in America are not inherently safer merely because they have a higher volume of ALPRs.

Nonetheless, local agencies are turning to Flock for their ALPR database and camera systems. Some cities essentially have an ALPR around every corner.

Top 10 most surveilled cities in the U.S. based on cameras per 1,000 people:

1. Atlanta, Georgia – 124.14 cameras per 1,000 people

2. Washington, D.C. – 55.54 cameras per 1,000 people

3. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania – 30.73 cameras per 1,000 people

4. San Francisco, California – 25.43 cameras per 1,000 people

5. Denver, Colorado – 20.08 cameras per 1,000 people

6. Chicago, Illinois – 18.51 cameras per 1,000 people

7. Albuquerque, New Mexico – 17.05 cameras per 1,000 people

8. Detroit, Michigan – 16.65 cameras per 1,000 people

9. Las Vegas, Nevada – 15.54 cameras per 1,000 people

10. Memphis, Tennessee – 13.54 cameras per 1,000 people

Top 10 most surveilled cities in the U.S. based on cameras per square mile:

1. Washington, D.C. – 573.8 cameras per square mile

2. Atlanta, Georgia – 448.4 cameras per square mile

3. San Francisco, California – 388.1 cameras per square mile

4. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania – 349.7 cameras per square mile

5. New York City, New York – 236 cameras per square mile

6. Chicago, Illinois – 212.4 cameras per square mile

7. Boston, Massachusetts – 112.8 cameras per square mile

8. Denver, Colorado – 91.6 cameras per square mile

9. Los Angeles, California – 84.8 cameras per square mile

10. Detroit, Michigan – 74.6 cameras per square mile

Washington, D.C. essentially relies on cameras to enforce traffic laws such as excessive speeding, wrongful turns, or reckless driving. The District of Columbia has the most cameras per square mile, as cited above. The problem with the district’s ALPR system is not only that it lacks due process safeguards, but critics also brand it as an unfair “cash grab.” The Stop DC CAMERA Act would eliminate the District of Columbia’s authority to use automated traffic enforcement cameras.

Local officials are in an uproar. Banning cameras in the District would mean the city loses hundreds of thousands of dollars in revenue, but DC officials insist that safety is their primary concern. Mayor Muriel Bowser (D) claimed that “removing [traffic] cameras would endanger people in our community” and called on federal officials to respect DC’s ability to govern its own streets.

The District could do a better job, however. While the District has begun suing drivers in other states who have neglected to pay tickets that they received from traffic cameras in the city, there are still outstanding fines to the tune of $1 billion. Traffic infractions are still essentially going unpunished, which brings into question the actual efficacy of the district’s camera system.

The Stop DC CAMERA Act advanced out of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee by a 21-19 vote this past March. This legislation, introduced by Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA) would only impact traffic cameras in our capital city. Rep. Scott Perry, along with Rep. Chuy Garcia (D-IL), previously introduced an amendment to the BUILD America 250 Act that would have restricted the use of ALPRs. This amendment targeted ALPRs mounted on traffic lights, police vehicles, and poles. The systems that log vehicle information, time stamps, and driving patterns, and interconnect databases that allow police to search movements outside of their jurisdiction would have also been restricted.

Regrettably, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee rejected the amendment. The amendment was a single sentence that read: “A recipient of assistance under Title 23, United States Code, may not use automated license plate readers for any purpose other than tolling.” While the language of the amendment is short, the reach would have been expansive.

Title 23 covers about a quarter of all public road mileage in the U.S., which includes most state, county, and city arteries where ALPRs are becoming ever more prevalent. This title of the United States Code governs the Federal-aid Highway Program that is administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). This program authorizes federal funding for projects such as traffic management systems, Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), highway safety improvements, and tolling infrastructure.

ALPRs are often installed as part of broader infrastructure projects funded under Title 23 to deploy ITS technologies. 23 U.S.C. Chapter 1 gives states broad authority over highway improvements while using federal funds; 23 U.S.C. § 148 establishes the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) that requires states to implement data-driven, strategic programs aimed at significantly reducing serious injuries and traffic fatalities on public roads; and 23 U.S.C. Chapter 5 supports ITS research and deployment. Federal tax dollars are used to bankroll massive surveillance under the guise of increased safety.

An important distinction must be made between ALPRs and cameras that are used to enforce traffic regulations. ALPRs scan every vehicle that passes through the lane it focuses on and then compare that plate to a database. The ALPR logs not only the vehicle’s tags but also specific details about the vehicle (make, model, stickers, damage, etc.) and the information is stored in perpetuity. This is how a profile is created. Traffic cameras used to crack down on speeding and other infractions will typically operate on a separate network and database. However, the database can be merged by law enforcement for specific investigations depending on the data-sharing agreement between local agencies and the camera/ALPR manufacturer.

And these databases are the source of even more trouble. In addition to the massive encroachment on the civil liberties of American citizens, these databases are abused by bad actors in law enforcement for personal vendettas. This poses a legitimate risk to public safety. To make matters worse, the data-sharing agreements are not as clear-cut as one would expect.

The list of ALPR database abuses is extensive and is a cause for concern among Americans across the political spectrum. Local and federal agencies break data-sharing agreements for the purposes of immigration enforcement and drug enforcement. Regardless of one’s policy position, the law is the law, and if agencies are not permitted to access a database of information without the express authority to do so, then violating such regulations is simply wrong. The ends do not justify the means.

In Massachusetts, lawmakers strengthened the Commonwealth’s “Shield Law,” which prohibits law enforcement from providing information or assistance to another state’s law enforcement agency in relation to investigations into abortion services or gender-affirming care. This did not stop police in Johnson County, Texas, from sweeping up data collected in Massachusetts in their nationwide search of the Flock database. Law enforcement in Texas conducted a search of Flock data for a woman they believe left Texas to receive an abortion in a state where it is legally permissible for her to do so.

Flock’s flawed nationwide data sharing model is designed to incentivize maximum data sharing; a police department that has chosen to share their data with the entire nationwide network is allowed to search the entire nationwide network. To share this data, all an administrator has to do is click a button.

In Illinois, an audit conducted by the office of the Illinois Secretary of State found that Flock violated state law by granting U.S. Customs and Border Protection access to ALPR data.

In 5,000 communities across the United States, ALPR data, specifically from Flock, was used to conduct more than 4,000 searches at the behest of the federal government or as an informal favor to federal agencies. ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations used ALPR cameras that were part of regular monitoring to search for undocumented immigrants using simple search terms like “locate alien” and “assist ERO.” A federal agent with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) used login credentials for Palos Heights Detective Todd Hutchinson to perform unauthorized searches related to immigration enforcement. Hutchinson was supposed to be the only person with access to the ALPR data and he insisted that the login information was given to the unidentified DEA agent because Hutchinson operated under the assumption that the data would only be used for investigations related to narcotics. Regardless, allowing someone else to access the database was misconduct.

There is a clear pattern of state laws being circumvented by the ALPR database’s function or being flagrantly violated by law enforcement. Abuse is not limited to larger agencies and ALPR manufacturers. Bad actors in local law enforcement have used data collected from ALPRs to search for and track romantic partners–past and present–and their close family members and friends.

Jarmarcus Brown of Orange City, Florida stalked his ex-girlfriend and close members of her family by looking up their license plates in the ALPR database more than 100 times. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Officer Josue Ayala was caught running the license plates of two women nearly 200 times over two months. The Milwaukee Police Department logged the term “investigation” more than 1,000 times; these meaningless one-word descriptions make it impossible to know whether the searches are being done for legitimate police business or personal exploitation.

A police chief in Sedgwick County, Kansas used the ALPR system to track his ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend. Chief Lee Nygaard searched the flock database to conduct searches on his ex-girlfriend 164 times and another 64 searches on the new boyfriend. He listed “missing child,” “drug investigation,” and “suspicious activity” as reasons for the search. At times, Nygaard would follow the couple and occasionally confront them. His actions were revealed amidst another investigation for misconduct. There are at least 21 more alarming examples of ALPR misconduct from people who are sworn to protect American communities.

Improvement in technology has not made ALPR cameras immune from making mistakes. This has put innocent people in frightening and dangerous situations. Denise Green was ordered to exit her car shortly after dropping her sister off at a BART station in San Francisco, California. Green was held at gunpoint and handcuffed until, after 20 minutes, officers finally realized that a mistake had been made. An ALPR camera had misread the “7” on her license plate as a “3” and flagged Green’s car as a stolen vehicle. Officers had not bothered to double-check.

One woman even had her property confiscated. Isoke Robinson was arrested in Detroit, Michigan after police used the ALPR database to search for all Dodge Chargers in the area in relation to a shooting investigation. Robinson’s 2-year-old son was placed in the back of a squad car and her car was impounded for 3 weeks. Robinson merely had the misfortune of owning a Dodge Charger and being the closest to the site of the shooting.

To no one’s surprise, public opinion is turning against ALPRs. Promises of greater public safety have failed to persuade the public and local governments while abuse from law enforcement–local and federal–and concerns about civil liberties mount. Localities are either terminating their contract with ALPR manufacturers or opting to let existing contracts expire without renewal.

Hillsborough, North Carolina canceled their contract citing concerns about data privacy. Language was included in the contract that could have been interpreted as allowing Flock to disclose to any government agency or third party based merely on “good faith.” The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is allowing the city’s deal with Flock to expire. Dean Gialamas, LAPD’s chief information officer, stated the contract would not be renewed “because of serious concerns around civil liberties and civil rights issues, particularly around privacy and the data that is being collected from these cameras.” Los Angeles, California ranks the 9th most surveilled city in the U.S. by cameras per square mile.

The LAPD’s decision not to renew its contract with Flock is notable because the LAPD is the third-largest police department in the U.S. and one of the largest government customers of Flock. The company has a network of at least 80,000 cameras around the country. 53 cities across 20 states have terminated or rejected contracts with Flock.

Flock has repeatedly lied to city councils, the public, and law enforcement agencies about the system’s capabilities and data-sharing. The Oshkosh City Council revoked its approval of a contract with Flock after the company’s chief information security officer lied to the council about the system’s ability to create a pattern of an individual’s movement. Flock has also changed their standard terms by removing language stating the company would not sell customer data; granting the company broad–and potentially perpetual–rights to use customer data to improve its service; and giving the company substantial control over how customers can access the data that they legally own.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) intends to purchase nationwide access to a network of ALPRs that would award contracts to vendors who offer “near real time” information from ALPRs across the U.S. The FBI states that it requires access to this data “to evaluate and manage threats to personal safety, property, and law enforcement.” Such a system would cover 75 percent of locations. The FBI says it needs to be able to search the database for plate numbers, plate states, addresses, locations where a plate was scanned, and the make, model, and detailed description of vehicles.

This comes at a time when Flock is expanding their surveillance capabilities. The company intends to plug its system into commercial data brokers that offer “people lookup” services. After claiming that Flock’s cameras do not collect personally identifiable information, this new product would give police the ability to go from ALPR to person rapidly. New plate readers would become surveillance cameras that offer law enforcement videos and pictures that make drivers easily identifiable. Information has never been more readily available in human history. Developments in technology and a new industrial and technological revolution are going to drastically change human life.

Our civil liberties do not change. Individual rights are inherent; they exist because we exist. As law enforcement tools evolve with changing technology, the ever-vigilant task of safeguarding timeless principles like the reasonable assumption of privacy and the right to face your accuser risks becoming more Herculean. Congress should end the ability of ALPR manufacturers to sell data collected from American motorists and prohibit federal aid from being used by localities to construct ALPRs along American roads.